The National Archives file BT233/218 gives the accident investigation for this incident and I would point anyone with an interest to this file. What I deduce from it is that the A.I.B. and the resulting Court of Inquiry made a number of suggestions as to what they believed happened but that the senior officers at the Royal Air Force Flying College disagreed with most of these suggestions.

The pilot was a highly experienced airman but in the last two years prior to the accident his flying time was low. He had flown just fifty hours prior to doing a jet conversion course at 209 AFS at Weston Zoyland on the Meteor type. He had then carried out just ten hours on the Canberra type with just seven of these as a first pilot at the time of his death. While his instrument rating was passed as acceptable when he arrived at the RAF Flying College it was found to be below standard. He was therefore inexperienced at flying a Canberra and relatively inexperienced in flying jets despite having a correct instrument rating which was then deemed below the standard at the Flying College. He therefore was required to undergo further training to get him to the standard required. The RAF Flying College did not have a dual control Canberra which would have significantly been an advantage to their flying training.

On 24th June 1954 the pilot was authorised to undertake an instrument flying training exercise but had been permitted to submit his own flight plan which was passed by the authorising officer. This should have seen a second pilot fly alongside him with a navigator in the third seat but no other student pilot was detailed to fly with him. A navigator was to sit the bomb aimer's seat for take off then move to a second seat to act as a safety lookout on the opposite side the aircraft to the pilot. The flight plan stated that, after taking off he was to climb to 5,000 feet, level out and change speed to 330 knots where he was also cover the artifical horizon. He was then to make a climbing turn to port, then a further climbing turn to starboard and at 20,000 feet level out, he was then to make several turns before undertaking some single engined flying practice. He would then descend to 15,000 feet, re-light the second engine, climb again to 20,000 feet, uncover the artifical horizon and then descend and return to land at Strubby.

No second pilot was made available so just the pilot and navigator then entered the Canberra and they took off from Strubby airfield, Lincolnshire at 12.54hrs. What then happened in the next few minutes after take off was unclear because there wasn't enough time for the pilot to have carried out his flight plan in the six or so minutes after taking off. At what would have been at 13.00hrs aircraft was seen flying in the Doncaster area in a blue sky with some small clouds. It overflew Doncaster and headed toward Sheffield at around 12,000 feet at what was believed to have been very high speed. The aircraft was also heard to be making a very loud noise. It then made a turn and flew back to Doncaster then made a second turn to again fly toward Sheffield again, still at very high speed slightly descending and still making a very loud noise. While over Balby the aircraft flew in and out of small cloud and then disintergrated at between 10,000 and 12,000 feet. Neither of the crew attempted to eject and were killed when the cockpit hit the ground between New Edlington and Warmsworth. Remarkably there were no civilian casualties on the ground.

Wreckage fell over a wide area some three miles long and half a mile wide over residental properties to the west of Doncaster. The vast majority fell into the housing estates of Balby. A large section of wing struck the roof of No.43 Waverley Avenue and fell into it's garden. Local police logged other large pieces as having being found at 54 Waverley Avenue, 12 Anelay Road, 14 Ashfield Road, 70 Cedar Road, 31 Lambeth Road and 18 Lambeth Road. Parts also fell onto a secondary school field at Balby. The rear fuselage fell into the playground of Warmsworth Primary School where a memorial to the incident was dedicated on the sixtieth anniversary of the accident. A photograph of the tail section is in the accident report and this appears to show it on the playground, now the carpark, at the front of the school. The forward momentum of both engines and the forward fuselage saw them travel the furthest. The starboard engine fell into what would probably have been rear gardens between Staveley Street and Victoria Road, New Edlington. The port engine fell into or close to allotments just north of New Edlington. The forward fuselage including the cockpit with both aircrew fell close to the LMSR railway line, either on the north (Warmsworth) side or on the south (New Edlington) side. The accident report contains two maps showing locations but the location of this differs between the two maps.

A detailed examination of the wreckage was made with everything taken to the English Electric factory at Warton for inspection. The starboard engine was found to have been shut down while the port engine was found to be set at full power at the time of the mid-air break up. The tailplane trim was found to have been abnormally set so that the nose of the aircraft one notch from full nose-up setting on the cockpit gauge. Owing to the high flying speed and the trim setting there was significant overstressing on the wings caused by the air load on them. It was thought that the aircraft was flying at around 450 knots at the time it disintergrated and the loud noise that was heard was because it was flying beyond its normal speed limitation. The trim setting combined with the high speed caused both wings to bend upwards and fail.

Various occurrances during the flight remained undiscovered or unexplained and, in very brief terms, the investigation concluded that the pilot was suffering anoxia prior to the aircraft breaking up. It was felt that he would not knowingly deviate from his flight plan and this must have occurred as there was not enough time to undertake flight at 20,000 feet before beginning single engine flying. There was no evidence that the aircraft had been flown over 15,000 feet in the minutes after taking off. No radio transmissions that could have been made to state there was a problem with the aircraft were made. While his jet flying experience and instrument ratings were on the low side it was also felt that he would not have knowingly put the tail trim wheel position close the maximum without a good reason and there appeared to have been none. The pilot's oxygen suppply regulator was set to be on high flow while the navigator's was set to normal supply, but the tube that connected the pilot's mask to the aircraft was found not connected. The Court of Inquiry decided that the likely cause of this accident was that the pilot was suffering from anoxia during the later stages of the flight. This could have seen him alter the flying controls and almost certainly deviate from his flight plan. Senior officers at the RAF Flying College disagreed with this finding, and (dare I say it) the way their statements read, they stated any fault must have been with the aircraft and not related to human error or errors in the way the Flying College operated. They believed that there had been an engine failure prior to the aircraft breaking up, which accounted for the single engined flying. They did not accept the pilot would have had a problem with his oxygen supply, let alone have required it at the height the aircraft was or had being flown. They did accept that the RAF Flying College did require a dual controlled Canberra to give pilot's dual control flying training, which this pilot had had none.

Pilot - G/Cpt Richard Thomas Fairfax Gates DFC AFC RAF (37064), aged 40. Cremated Golders Green Crematorium, London.

Navigator - F/Lt Peter Oliver RAF (177340), aged 32. Cremated Cheltenham Crematorium, Gloucestershire.