Blenheim L8731 near Church Fenton.
Researching this whole incident it does suggest a totally shambolic way No.64 Squadron and also Church Fenton airfield flying control operated at the start of the Second World War but this may be down to there being significantly more information available for this incident than for incidents elsewhere. Perhaps it was the same everywhere. I would point anyone wanting a more detailed view of the incident toward the casualty file held in the National Archives under file reference AIR81/1641 to form their own independant opinion.
During the morning of 8th November 1939 three pilots of A-Flight, 64 Squadron, based at Church Fenton, received orders from their commanding officer to undertake a formation flying exercise at dawn. When it was still dark and at around 05.55hrs all three pilot's got into their Blenheim aircraft on dispersal points and awaited further instructions. At that time it was still dark for at least forty minutes. For the flight the lead (No.1) aircraft was to have been piloted by F/Sgt Herbert Branwell Hackney, the No.2 was to have been piloted by Sgt George Herbert Hatch and the No.3 was due to have been P/O Carter. A standing order operating at Church Fenton airfield at that time stated that a mobile lighting beacon near or at Sherburn in Elmet airfield had to be lit before any night flying could take place at Church Fenton airfield, this would give pilots an indication of heights, ground level reference etc. The standing order forbid pilots to take off without this beacon being lit. Communications between Church Fenton airfield and the mobile light station did not work so the lighting was not turned on but with dawn approaching this should not have been a major problem if flying did not commence until then. These communication issues appear to have delayed taking off for at least half an hour with the pilots being sat in the aircraft and possibly with the engines eventually being run up. With the pilots still waiting to take off at 06.15hrs the commanding officer decided that because the beacon was not lit and that a bank of cloud was approaching the airfield he would change the orders. Radio messages were sent to the three aircraft from the control tower with words to the effect that only the pilot of lead No.1 aircraft was to take off, he would first undertake a short weather check flight to assess the general flying conditions. Subject to the conditions being suitable the other two aircraft would then take off and they would then begin the formation flying exercise. Radio messages were transmitted to all three pilots of the change of plan but only the No.1 and No.2 pilots were heard to acknowledge this order and nothing was heard from No.3.
With it still dark and without warning or any indication of it about to happen the No.3 aircraft, Blenheim L8731, then took off at 06.30hrs in blackout conditions on the airfield on a heading roughly south-west. It flew into a line of poplar trees near the village church. It remained in the air for some three to four hundred yards longer then crashed into a field, passed through a fence and broke up. While the crash was not seen by anyone on the airfield it was heard and immediately they contacted flying control.
Moments after the No.3 aircraft took off, the No.1 aircraft took off to undertake the weather check. Once in the air flying control radioed him to ask who else was in the air and for him to search for the crash. This pilot did not know anyone else had taken off ahead of him and could not locate the crash in the darkness so returned to Church Fenton and landed. The crash site was located near Rose Farm by people on the ground and the pilot was found clinging to life next to the wreckage. He sadly died moments after a medical officer arrived. A second airman was also found next to one of the engines in a seriously injured condition. Both were immediately taken back to sick quarters at Church Fenton airfield though the injured airman was immediately transferred to York Military Hospital where he died a short time later.
Various issues should not have occurred and all of them contributed to the accident. Flying Control should not have allowed any to take off from Church Fenton without the lighting beacon being lit; both No.3 and also the No.1 aircraft took off in the dark. P/O Carter was not a qualified night flying pilot, while he had verbally stated to the commanding officer and to other pilots that he was qualified in reality he had only been passed fit for solo night flying and had not actually undertaken any solo night flying training. This also meant that he was not qualified to carry a passenger. No-one in command was aware that a passenger was being carried. The commanding officer had not checked P/O Carter's logbook to see whether he was qualified to fly solo at night. The other two pilots later stated that condensation on their aircraft's windows affected visibility, it was assumed that P/O Carter would have suffered the same problem. After the crash the radio equipment inside the wreckage was inspected and it was found that the radio was switched off. It was felt that it was impossible for this to have occurred during the crash so must have been in the off position prior to taking off. With this the case it was highly unlikely that he had heard the commanding officer's message that the orders were changed.
It was felt what probably happened was that P/O Carter did not have his radio switched on so was unable to hear the change of orders. While sat waiting on the ground and through condensation-obscured windows he may have seen the No.1 aircraft move from a dispersal and assumed that this was the No.2 aircraft. With the general darkness at the airfield he would not have then been able to see what happened to it and assumed it (being the No.2) had taken off. It was also thought that as he had to take off behind the No.2 aircraft he then moved off from his dispersal and immediately took off. Once in the air, the windows were still obscured with condensation, he had no lighting beacon to assist him with a ground reference and he also had undertaken no solo night flying training. Being lower than he thought he was, he knew he had to raise the flaps after taking off but raised them too early. When the flaps were raised generally this caused the Blenheim to sink toward the ground slightly. It was felt that at the point that he raised the flaps he was not at a height that would see the aircraft clear any obstructions in its path. The aircraft sunk toward the ground, flew into trees and the crash then resulted. Other organisational issues were felt to have been a contributing factor. The flight commander had only been in position for one day and he was the fourth flight commander in as many days. The squadron's commanding officer did not have had a precise knowledge of the standard of training of his pilots. The only reason the beacon was not lit was because the radio communications between Church Fenton and the beacon site near Sherburn in Elmet were not established, so that the radio signal asking them for the beacon to be lit was not received. It was found that a lack of wireless operators at Sherburn in Elmet saw a ground electrician be posted to operate the set and that because the plug on the headset was not fully pushed into it's socket it had prevented the message being received (/heard).
Pilot - P/O Desmond Charles Reid Carter RAF (40604), aged 27. Buried Kirkby Wharfe Cemetery, Yorkshire.
Passenger (/ Air Gunner) - LAC Geoffrey George James Lovegrove RAF (527690), aged 23. Died of injuries 12th November 1939. Buried Wakefield Cemetery, Yorkshire (Sec.C/597).
Desmond Carter was from Eltham, Taranaki, New Zealand. He was granted a short service Commission to the rank of Acting P/O on probation with effect of 26th March 1938. He was awarded his pilots wings on 9th July 1938 and was
confirmed in the rank and graded as P/O on 17th January 1939. He was posted in to 64 Squadron on 4th September 1939.
Geoffrey Lovegrove was buried locally to his family at Wakefield Cemetery.
Air historians Albert Pritchard, Eric Barton and Ken Reast located small fragments on the surface at the crash site in October 2002 with permission from the landowner, confirming the crash location. Eric retained a few small fragments of the aeroplane following his visit and these were passed to me in 2022 to find a new home for.
Blenheim L8731 was built to contract 551920/37 by Rootes Securities Ltd at Speke and was delivered to 64 Squadron who were based at Church Fenton in August 1939.
The aircraft sustained severe damage in the accident on 8th November 1939, Cat.W/FA damage was recorded following assessment and the aircraft was struck off charge.
